ii particular. (His plans for bilateral as opposed to regional or multilateral trade deals are less clear, as regards both theory and practice).
Should Mr Trump proceed with his threatened withdrawal from the TPP upon his inauguration, 5 the TPP in its current form is undeniably dead. However, two alternative futures exist for the TPP. First, at the time of writing, while plans to submit the TPP in the lame-duck session of Congress before Trump's inauguration have been abandoned, 6 key stakeholders still predict that the United States might agree to renegotiate the treaty. 7 Second, even if the United States is out, the other negotiating parties may remain committed to the TPP or something very like it, raising the possibility of a 'TPP-11'. Renegotiation would not be easy, particularly given the heavy influence of United States demands and drafting on the TPP text, which for example bears a strong resemblance to existing United States preferential trade agreements. 8 Moreover, the TPP market absent the United States would be considerably smaller, leading to necessary recalculations of its likely benefits, 9 which were already contentious. 10 On 30 November 2016, the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties ('JSCOT') of the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia released its report on the TPP. 11 JSCOT recommended that Australia ratify the TPP, while making certain other recommendations reflecting various concerns with the agreement, such as a recommendation for enhanced transparency in the negotiation of trade agreements by allowing 'security cleared representatives from business and civil society to see the Australian Government positions being put as part of those negotiations'. 12 (In the United States, for example, a suite of advisory iii committees including industry and NGO representatives 13 provides input into trade policy and negotiations, 14 sometimes also reviewing draft negotiating texts subject to obligations of confidentiality). JSCOT also recommended for future trade agreements 'independent modelling and analysis … by the Productivity Commission, or equivalent organisation', to be provided to JSCOT alongside the national interest assessment prepared by the government. 15 The Australian Greens dissented from JSCOT's report, 16 while the Australian Labor Party members of the committee submitted 'additional comments' expressing concerns with several aspects of the TPP. 17 Separately, the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee of the Australian Senate is conducting an inquiry into the TPP and is scheduled to report by 7 February 2017. 18 Why should or might Australia ratify the TPP notwithstanding Trump's election? While the dissenting and concurring JSCOT comments referred explicitly to Trump and the pointlessness of Australia ratifying the agreement, 19 the majority JSCOT report implicitly acknowledged recent developments in the United States, the United Kingdom and elsewhere in concluding that Australia should take binding treaty action with respect to the TPP:
The Committee is particularly concerned that Australia's long-term commitment to free trade, from which Australia benefits immensely, is currently at risk from a resurgence of nationalism and isolationism internationally.
The Committee believes that Australia should hold to its principles and continue to promote free trade as a mechanism that provides improvements to the lives of people everywhere. 20 Ratification by the remaining TPP countries may thus provide an internal and external political signal -that is, to both domestic constituencies and international actors -of the perceived value of trade liberalisation and foreign investment in promoting national and global welfare, with the conceivable potential to influence the next steps of other TPP countries, if not the United States. At the same time, international developments in 2016, including the outcomes of the United States election and the Brexit vote, as well as the near collapse 21 26 currently under negotiation by the ten member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ('ASEAN') and ASEAN's existing preferential trade agreement partners: Australia, China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand.
To the extent that the United States is to withdraw from the globalising world, China will be ready 27 to carry out a different kind of 'pivot to Asia', 28 capitalising on the United States' failure to 'write the rules of the road in the 21 st century' 29 through the TPP. Yet the possibility of such a shift exists alongside the real risk of a major trade war between the United States and China. 30 Through RCEP as well as its ongoing bilateral negotiations, 31 Australia could play a substantial and hopefully tempering role in the development of the new economic and political landscape in the Asian region and beyond. 23 v At the level of treaty drafting, TPP provisions are already being duplicated or used as a basis for other treaties and negotiations. For example, in October 2016, the TPP signatories Australia and Singapore signed an agreement to amend their existing preferential trade agreement, 32 which includes (for example) unusual provisions from the TPP on both international mobile roaming 33 (as discussed in this special issue by Mr Danny Kotlowitz and Professor Tania Voon) and the exclusion of tobacco control measures from investor-state dispute settlement. 34 Similar state practice may be expected in other agreements between TPP-11 countries and also in agreements between TPP-11 countries and other countries. Based on leaked texts, the unusual mobile roaming provisions from the TPP have made their way into negotiations towards the Trade in Services Agreement. 35 Also based on leaked texts, provisions from the TPP intellectual property chapter (for example regarding copyright exceptions) are being proposed in negotiations for the RCEP. 36 Furthermore, given the strong United States imprint on the TPP text, the TPP may be expected to set a baseline in at least some areas in any bilateral deals that the United States itself decides to pursue as part of the new administration's trade and investment strategy, whatever that may turn out to be in reality.
The TPP offers significant opportunities to promote domestic and international reform in several areas. For example, Viet Nam is said to be undertaking sweeping changes pursuant to TPP requirements. 37 The decision to implement such reforms may take account of not only the standards set in the TPP itself (given the possibility of its eventual entry into force in some form, as well as bilateral agreements reached with the United States in conjunction with the TPP labour chapter, as discussed by Associate Professor Joo-Cheong Tham and Professor Keith Ewing in this special issue) but also the TPP's influence on future treaties, as noted above. Calls for enhanced transparency and improved domestic processes in treaty negotiation and conclusion have also crystallised around the TPP, as evidenced by the JSCOT report just released. The concerns that Associate Professor Amokura Kawharu raises in this special issue regarding the negotiation and conclusion of the TPP in New Zealand provide one example of acute process problems with treaty-making in many countries.
Finally, the TPP offers a rich source of material for reflection and critique. How does its 'public law-reformed' version of investor-state dispute settlement 38 compare to the European Commission's proposal for a world vi investment court? 39 Professor Luke Nottage addresses both in this special issue, while Dr Jarrod Hepburn considers enduring public international law questions raised by not only the TPP but also 'mega-regional' agreements in general. Such questions of overlapping treaties and the role of domestic law will equally arise, for example, in the RCEP. How to improve on the TPP's intellectual property chapter in future agreements, in view of Associate Professor Kimberlee Weatherall's assessment of that chapter as a failure in this special issue? Will the TPP's approach to fisheries subsidies, as discussed here by Ms Amanda Rologas Tsangalis, find a place in another agreement, or can further progress be made?
As the vision of the TPP as a living agreement recedes, it nevertheless offers a window into the negotiation of trade and investment agreements and the negotiated positions of the 12 TPP countries on a range of matters of crucial importance to the global economy today. Given the rise of nationalism reflected in recent world events, we are pleased to be part of a community engaging with the TPP and its lessons for the future. 
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